Army Force Management Model



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Army Force Management Process – Strategy to Structure.

The Army Force management process provides prudent adjustments to the existing force, while balancing force structure requirements (manpower and equipment) within available and planned resources. Force structure adjustments are based on guidance, constraints, and previous leadership decisions.

Recognize that we start this process with an existing Army. That is, we are modifying existing force structure, not developing a force from scratch.

The role of the Army is to conduct prompt and sustained combat on land. The world social and political environment in which that role must be played is shifting dramatically and constantly. Therefore, no one can predict when, how or where the United States may be called upon to project military power. To accomplish the mission of deterring conflict and winning wars, the Army must continuously change in order to provide the most combat effective force, within available resources, for **joint and expeditionary roles**.

Successfully integrating new doctrine, organizations, and materiel into the Army requires synchronizing multiple levels of command and diverse management structures and systems. This is not possible unless professionals at all levels understand how the Army organizes, trains, and equips forces as they do about how the Army fights. The actions to create a capable force (relevant and ready) are those that structure, man, equip, train, sustain, station, deploy and fund organizations.

The Army's TRANSFORMATION is driven by Strategic Requirements.

The Army must manage force structure changes. The Army Force Management Model is process the Army has adapted to graphically depict how it will manage force structure changes.

"Ours is the business of CHANGE." LTG Richard Trefry, USA (Ret).

Figure 1 depicts the detailed graphics found in Chapter 2 of the Army War College text, "How the Army Runs" (HTAR) and page 1 of this primer. This primer compliments, updates and amplifies the information contained in the Army War College text. **Figure 1** summarizes the major functions and processes. **Figure 1** will be used to orient you as we move through the sequence of this primer, ***highlighting*** each of the functions will be covered. **Further**, any graphic can be opened, enlarged or imported into a PowerPoint presentation.



FIGURE 1

General:

1. A caution: many of the Force Management processes are changing or evolving, reflecting modifications to the process. Some of the more significant changes will be highlighted throughout this primer.

2. This model reflects a **System of Systems approach**.

3. Each process provides an essential force management function and, more importantly, the model shows how these **functions relate** to each other – specifically the relationships of Army processes **to each other** and to the major **DOD management processes**.

4. The underlying basis for this model is that force management, in its simplest context, is the management of change using many inter-related and complex processes.

5. Although this diagram depicts a some-what linear model, in a **sequential** manner, managing change may mandate that any one or several of these processes occur **simultaneously**, in **parallel**, in **compressed** format or in **reverse** depending on **urgency**, **risk** and senior leader **guidance**.

6. Eventually all of the steps must take place to produce a fully trained and equipped operational force at the right time and at the right place for the Combatant Commanders.

7. The Army has adapted the force management model (figure 1) to develop balanced and synchronized solutions to the strategy and policy established through OSD.

8. In this network, strategic and senior leadership guidance, the processes for determining warfighting requirements, conducting research and development, and prioritizing resources **all** provide input to the force development process. The resulting product of force development, in turn, provides the basis for the force integrating function of acquire and distributing materiel, as well as acquiring, training and distributing personnel in the Army.

DETERMINE STRATEGIC and OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS:

1. **Determine Strategic and Operational Requirements**. This is where the PURPLE (DOD) and GREEN (HQDA) interface. OSD starts the process with the receipt of national security directives, initiating the **three major** inter-related OSD planning systems displayed across the center of this block (figure 2).

2. The national security strategy and defense planning guidance DRIVE the Army's future force structure. Guidance from the President of the United States, decisions by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, products from the DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process (PPBE), and directives and initiatives of the Joint Staff (JS) are all initiating actions or processes in the DOD level planning process.



FIGURE 2

3. The Defense Planning Process establishes the bridge from the office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff guidance to the Army's PPBE process. The Army's planning and programming processes develop Army force structure designed to meet the guidance from the President, office of the Secretary of Defense, and the needs of the Combatant Commanders.

Defense Planning Process has three steps.

a. The 1st step -- identifies the "NATIONAL VALUES and INTERESTS". These are articulated in the President's National Security Strategy providing **common direction** to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, **Combatant Commander's** and Services.

b. The 2nd Step -- assesses the THREAT to these "VALUES" and "INTERESTS". The SECDEF formulates the Defense Policy and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs Staff subsequently recommends the National Military Strategy that describes the MILITARY STRATEGY and the CAPABILITIES required to execute that strategy.

c. The final step is to determine the most effective mix of forces, weapons and manpower (all Services) to execute our defense policy and the military strategy, and **ultimately** build POM submissions. The National Military Strategy articulates the military strategy to the Services and provides force structure guidance to the services incorporated in what was the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The old DPG provided the guidance until replaced this year by the Strategic **Planning** Guidance (SPG) and the Joint **Programming** Guidance (JPG).

1. The Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) and Joint Programming Guidance (JPG) provide planning and programming direction to the Services in preparation for the development of the Services' POM submissions.

2. The SPG (published in May 2004) provided unified, resource informed, strategic objectives, key assumptions, priorities, fiscal projections and acceptable risks. The SPG focuses on "**what**" needs to be done, not the "how".

3. The SECDEF's JPG – published in June 2004 – provides fiscally constrained programming guidance, directing the Services to program towards the strategic objectives. The JPG focuses on the "how" and the "how well to do it."

4. Displayed across the center of the Determine Strategic and Operational Requirements are the three major OSD planning systems.

a. Joint Operations, Planning and Execution System (JOPES) – provides an integrated and coordinated approach to developing, approving and publishing OPLANS. JOPES is concerned with the deployment and employment of current forces - not the future force requirements.

b. Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with members of the JCS and Combatant Commanders, assists the President and SECDEF in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces; advises the SECDEF on programming priorities; prepares strategic plans; and advises the SECDEF on the program recommendations and budget proposals of the Services and DOD combat support agencies.

c. Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) Process is focused towards producing a plan, program and defense budget that is strategy driven providing the best mix of forces, equipment, and support available for the Combatant Commanders (COCOM) within

constrained resources. DOD PPBE incorporates the policy and strategy in the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG); and produces the Joint Programming Guidance (JPG).

5. This primer will focus on the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process.

6. The ***key output***, which initiates the Army Planning System, is the programming guidance that is currently provided by the SEC DEF in his Strategic **Planning** Guidance, and Joint **Programming** Guidance.

DEVELOP CAPABILITIES:

1. The **DEVELOP CAPABILITIES** is the function that has evolved the most. A primer has been developed (www.afms1.army.mil) providing the field with an understanding of the process, decision points and out puts.

2. The receipt of OSD and Senior Army Leader guidance initiates the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). JCIDS is the new Joint Capabilities – based requirements generation process. The objective of JCIDS is to develop a balanced and synchronized solution proposal that is affordable, militarily useful, supportable and based on mature technology. JCIDS **identifies capabilities** needed to accomplish the **strategic** and **operation requirements**. The capabilities are investigated within the DOMAINS of ***doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities*** commonly referred to as the domains of DOTMLPF.



DOTMLPF originated in the Army. Each component of DOTMLPF is an area providing focus for action officers to investigate solutions, products, and services to meet the required capabilities delineated in DOD directives. DOTMLPF is a very useful tool for looking at a large issue or set of issues,

and breaking it apart into more discrete, manageable sets of tasks and deliverables.

3. JCIDS develops an integrated set of Army DOTMLPF requirements that support national strategies and guidance, and operational needs of the combatant commanders. This process assesses future Joint and Army warfighting functional needs and solutions.



4. The analysis process is composed of a structured, four-phased methodology that defines capability **gaps**, capability **needs,** and approaches to provide those capabilities within a specified functional or operational area. Based on national defense policy and centered on a common joint warfighting construct, the analyses initiate the development of integrated, joint capabilities investigating solutions within Army domains of DOTMLPF.

5. This process examines where we are, where we want to be, what risks we may face and what it might cost.

6. The focus of JCIDS is to resolve identified ***CAPABILITY GAPS, PERCEIVED DEFICIENCIES*** or ***SHORTCOMING*** in the **current force structure**.

7. TRADOC FUTURE CENTER submits DOTMLPF solution sets for ARSTAF validation and CSA approval via the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) validation and approval process.

8. The Army Force Management School's primary focus for instruction is on the domains of **Organizational change** and **Materiel solutions.**

9. The ***Key Output*** is the recommendation of a solution within the domain of DOTMLPF to the ARSTAF.

MATERIEL ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT PROCESS:

1. If the DOTMLPF solution to the capability gap or shortcoming is determined to be within the Materiel domain, hardware is developed to meet the requirement. Materiel solutions are developed within the Materiel Acquisition Management Process.



2. In the broad sense, the Acquisition process consists of a series of **SEQUENTIAL MANAGEMENT DECISIONS**, made in **DOD** or the **ARMY,** as the development of a materiel system progresses from a stated Materiel Requirement to the fielding of an *OPERATIONAL* and *SUPPORTABLE* system, in Accordance with DoD INSTRUCTIONS **5000.1** and **5000.2.**

3. The graphic on the right reflects the Acquisition process, the milestones and the decision points as the hardware system moves through the process, and the relationship of the sub-processes.



4. Materiel Developers document the changes in Equipment and Personnel, and the Equipment distribution plan through the Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP).

5. The "KEY OUTPUT" of this sub-process is the Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP) **FEEDER DATA.** The **BOIPFD** is the primary input to the BOIP, a requirements document, developed in the next phase by the United States Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA). BOIP is discussed in the Develop Organization Models phase.

DESIGN ORGANIZATIONS:

1. If, however, the DOTMLPF solution developed in the "Develop Capabilities" block is an Organizational Solution, we move to the DESIGN ORGANIZATIONS PHASE. In this phase we address new organizations and modification to existing organizations. The Design Organizations phase analyzes the proposed organization for **doctrinal correctness**.

2. Organizational requirements flowing from the Functional Solution Analysis (FSA) determine whether a new or modified organization is required on tomorrow's battlefield. Once identified, organizational **requirements** are documented through a series of connected and related organizational development processes:

Unit Reference Sheet (URS) development;
Force Design Update (FDU) process;
Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) development;



Basis-of-Issue Plan (BOIP) development

3. It provides a forum for the entire Army to review the issue and links the **Combat, Materiel, Training, and Document Developer** together.

4. **The next step is the force design update (FDU) process –** TRADOC's Force Design Division (FDD), at FT. Leavenworth, shepherds the FDU process for the Army.

5. This is where we take a good idea from a variety of sources, staff them through the proponent schools, forward to FDD to ensure the proposed organizational solution is **doctrinally correct**, through the CG, TRADOC to the CSA/VCSA for **decision** and **implementation instructions**.

6. The proposal contains sufficient data about a unit's personnel and equipment to support Army force design initiatives.

7. The FDU process develops a consensus within the Army on new organizations and changes to existing organizations. During the FDU, the URS is staffed throughout the Army. The FDU process obtains approval and implementation decisions.

8. Proposed organizational solutions to meet desired capabilities require the development of a Unit Reference Sheet (URS). The URS contains sufficient data about a unit's personnel and equipment to support Army force design initiatives. The URS captures relevant data such as proposed unit title, design description, mission, assignment, tasks, assumptions, limitations, mobility requirements, and concept of operations. The FDU serves as the link between the development of the URS and the development of the TOE (the URS ultimately leads to a TOE).



9. **EXAMPLE**:

a. The Brigade Combat Team (Unit of Action) graphic represents one of the proposed solutions to resolve a known capability deficiency in the current force. This effort resets the brigade combat teams as the basic unit of maneuver, enabling them **with** organic combat, combat support, and sustainment capabilities **while** assuring connectivity to higher and joint assets. Division and higher headquarters become streamlined modular organizations capable of commanding and controlling any combination of capabilities, Army or Joint.

b. The graphic on the right represents the original design included in the initial O & O Plan, dated June 2003 (operational and organizational plan). The UA brigade design included 3 maneuver battalions supported by a field artillery battalion of three batteries – of 6 guns – with approximately 177



soldiers per battery – with 2 platoons of 3 cannons – each platoon approx 17 soldiers.

c. As FDD continued to work all of the modularity issues through the FDU process, several of the unit designs have been approved by the CSA. The approved design for the heavy UA (dated Mar 2004) has:

- 2 maneuver battalions organic to the BCT (UA).
- Each BCT (UA) has an FA battalion organic consisting of 2 firing batteries with 8 cannons each.
- Each firing battery has 2 firing platoons of 4 Cannons. Each platoon is designed with approximately 2 / 0 / 42 Soldiers.
- The approved wiring diagram is shown above.

10. The ***Key Output*** is an approved design and implementation instructions from the CSA or VCSA.

Since the original Mar 2004 approval, several additional design improvements have been approved by the CSA.

11. Upon Approval of the organizational design as our output - we move to the DEVELOP ORGANIZATION MODELS.

DEVELOP ORGANIZATION MODELS

1. We start this phase with two potential inputs:

a. A Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP) for a new piece of equipment from the Materiel Acquisition Management System – OR

b. An FDU decision for an organizational change from the Design Organization block.

2. Following approval during the FDU process, the unit reference sheet (URS) or design (currently wiring diagrams from briefing charts for modularity) goes to United States Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA).

3. USAFMSA and USASOC develop TOEs and BOIPs codifying the input from the FDU process (URS basic design) or the Materiel Acquisition Management Process (BOIP feeder data).USAFMSA and USASOC apply **rules, standards, and guidance** to the doctrinally correct design to



produce a new organizational model – called the Table of Organization and Equipment or TOE, or modify an existing TOE. The TOE is a requirements document and is the definition of a fully mission-capable organization.

a. A TOE prescribes the doctrinal wartime mission, organizational structure, personnel and equipment requirements for a military unit and is the model for authorization documents.

b. TOEs depict mission-essential wartime requirements (MEWR) for sustained combat operations and provide models for levels of organization for units when available resources dictate that all like units cannot be organized at their full wartime requirement (that is -- less than ALO1 – ALO being Authorized Level of Organization).



c. The approved organization design should capture personnel and equipment requirements as accurately and completely as possible. People – by grade, skill, quantity, paragraph and Line. Equipment – by line item number, quantity, paragraph and line.

d. The design parameters are no longer approximately 2 platoons of field artillery. It is exactly one FA battery, of two platoons, of four howitzer sections each. The design is no longer approximately xx and yy for personnel and equipment. Personnel are exactly by grade, by skill, by MOS, by paragraph and Line Number (LIN). Equipment is by type, quantity, equipment readiness code (ERC) paragraph and LIN.

EXAMPLE – TO&E – FA Platoon

PARA	MOSLN	GR	SDT ERC		TITLE	LVL1	LVL2	LVL3
5					(X8) HOWITZWER SECTION (105T)	8	8	8
5	13B3O	E6	ECF		HOWITZER SECTION CHIEF	8	8	8
5	13B2O	E5	AGG		GUNNER	8	8	8
5	13B2O	E5	EAI		AMMUNITION TEAM CHIEF	8	8	8
5	13B1O	E4	AED		ASSISTANT GUNNER	8	8	8
5	13B1O	E4	AHD		PRIME MOVER DRIVER	8	8	8
5	13B1O	E3	AFG		CANNONEER	16	8	0
5	C68719			B	CABLE TELEPHONE: WD-1/TT DR-8 1/2 KM	24	24	24
5	C89070			B	CAMOUFLAGE SCREEN SUPPORT SYSTEM: WOODLAND/DESERT	48	48	48
5	C89070			B	CAMOUFLAGE SCREEN SUPPORT SYSTEM: WOODLAND/DESERT	-48	-48	-48
5	C89145			B	CAMOUFLAGE SCREEN SYSTEM: WOODLAND LT WT RADAR SCAT W/O S	48	48	48
5	C89145			B	CAMOUFLAGE SCREEN SYSTEM: WOODLAND LT WT RADAR SCAT W/O S	-48	-48	-48
5	C89480			B	CAMOUFLAGE NET SYSTEM RADAR SCATTERING: AN/USQ-159	48	48	48
5	D31693			A	DATA DISPLAY GROUP GUN DIRECTION }D-144(V)3/GYK-29	8	8	8
5	D41659			A	DRIVERS ENHANCERS: AN/VAS-5	8	8	8
5	D41659			B	DRIVERS ENHANCERS: AN/VAS-5	8	8	8
5	D78555			A	DATA TRANSFER DEVICE: AN/CYZ-10	8	8	8
5	D78555			A	DATA TRANSFER DEVICE: AN/CYZ-10	8	8	8
5	E63728			B	COMPASS MAGNETIC UNMOUNTED: MIL GRADUATIONS	16	16	16
5	F17031			A	FUZE SETTER: PORTABLE	8	8	8
5	H57505			P	HOWITZER LIGHT TOWED: M119	8	8	8
5	H57505			P	HOWITZER LIGHT TOWED: M119	-8	-8	-8
5	K23814			B	HEADSET-MICROPHONE: H-182/PT	8	8	8
5	K27988			A	KIT PRIME MOVER: LIGHT HOWITZER HEAVY VARIANT HMMWV (L119)	8	8	8

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4. **Example**: The URS provided approximate information for design, personnel, and equipment. The FDU process recommended approval of a doctrinally correct, Army-wide reviewed design, with appropriate personnel and equipment requirements.

		URS	**FDU**
a.	**Design:**	**3 X 6**	**2 X 8**
b.	**Personnel**:	1 / 0 / 20	1 / 0 / 14 (by grade, skill, quantity, para & LIN)
c.	**Equipment**:	18 Howitzers	16 Howitzers

5. USAFMSA and USASOC develop TOEs and BOIPs codifying the input from the URS basic design or the BOIP feeder data.

a. TOE development was adequately covered above.

b. USAFMSA develops BOIPs. BOIPs are requirement documents that specify the change in personnel and equipment for each organization. The BOIP specifies the addition of personnel by grade, skill, MOS, paragraph, line, and quantity. Equipment is specified by LIN, paragraph, line, quantity and ERC. BOIPs also apply to organizations which might not be issued the primary system, but provide support, maintenance, or command/control.

6. The TOES and BOIPS are the **KEY OUTPUT** from this process.

DETERMINE ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS

1. After HQDA approves the TOE, the desired unit type enters into the resourcing phase, where the organizational model competes for resources through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution Process (PPBE). The determine organizational authorizations phase provides the mix of organizations, resulting in a balanced, and affordable, force structure, which supports the strategic and operational planning from the joint and Army Guidance. Guidance for this phase includes externally imposed constraints of dollars, end strength, roles, and missions.

2. **ARMY GUIDANCE**:

a. Similar to the guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Army leadership provides guidance and direction.

b. The Secretary of the Army (SA) and the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA), G-3/5/7 and G-8 provide the directives, guidance and directions to the Army Secretariat, Army Staff (ARSTAF) and MACOMs in form, substance, direction and process to accomplish the missions through the Army Planning System and develop force structure to meet OSD guidance.

c. To get from the current force to the **CSA vision** for the future force, we have to understand the inputs or guidance that modifies the current force and the process to design the future force.

1. Some of the guidance is listed here:

a. National/OSD level: National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Defense Strategy, and Combatant Commander's (COCOM) Requirements.

b. Army level: Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) rebalance, Force XXI, modularity, Research, Development and Acquisition (RDA), Army Modernization Plan (AMP), Army National Guard Reorganization System (ADRS), and Army Guard Reorganization Initiative (AGRI).

2. Based on the guidance, TAA modifies the current force, identifies the total requirements and ultimately resources with authorizations the future force.

3. Specific Examples of Army guidance and direction - The Army Posture Statement
The Objective Force Concept
The Army in 2020
The "Way Ahead"

d. "**The Way Ahead**". The key Army planning document is "The Way Ahead". The CSA addressed **relevance** and **readiness** as the key issues.

1. "The Way Ahead" provides an overview of the Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG) - representing the Army senior leadership's **vision** of how the Army will fulfill its mission to provide the necessary forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies.

2. CSA focuses on the Transformation of the Army while at war, while retaining a wide range of capabilities while significantly improving its flexibility and versatility.

3. Graphically, the CSA addressed the Transformation from the Current Force to the Future Force, emphasizing the constant evolving capabilities and the accelerated Development and fielding of DOTMLPF solutions when he originally drew the slide – shown on the right. The CSA drew this graphic depicting how he envisioned the transformation of the Army to the future force.



e. The CSA's intent with respect to force structure is to:

- build a campaign-capable, joint and expeditionary Army in this decade, **WHILE AT WAR**.
- provide trained and ready forces to Combatant Commanders to sustain global operations
- balance capabilities between active and reserve components.
- provide stability and predictability to Soldiers and their families

Army Core Competencies:
- Train and equip Soldiers and grow leaders.
- Provide relevant & ready land power capability to the combatant commander as part of the Joint Team.

f. In "The Way Ahead", the CSA highlighted his **two Core Competencies** and his **17 Focus AREAS** to channel the Army's efforts towards winning the Global War on Terrorism and increasing the relevance, readiness, flexibility and versatility of the Army.



g. The "WAY AHEAD" is the basis for The Army Plan (TAP). This graphic depicts the transition from **ARMY VISION** articulated in the Army Strategic Planning Guidance, TO **PLANNING** found in the Army Planning Priorities Guidance based on OSD guidance, TO **ENDS** where the Army Program Guidance

Memorandum addresses the Army's 17 Immediate Focus Areas and finally TO **EXECUTION** through the Army Campaign Plan (ACP).



Sec I: Identifies strategic vision and intent.
Sec II: Translates the vision into prioritized capabilities
Sec III: Resourcing tasks; linking vision – capabilities & resources
Sec IV: Army Campaign Plan – synchronized road map of "How" to meet the strategic goals.

3. Determine Organizational Authorizations is an extremely complicated sequence of processes and sub-processes, involving a significant amount of staff work, man-hours and sequential decision points. Once HQDA approves the TOE, the unit type competes for resources through the PPBE process. The PPBE process is discussed in great detail in the PPBE primer found at www.afms1.army.mil.



4. This phase determines the correct mix of organizations **required** and **resourced** to meet the guidance. Guidance for this phase includes externally imposed constraints of dollars and end strength.

5. The graphic below represents the flow of the PPBE process. The TAA process is what moves the PPBE process from Planning to Programming, providing the POM FORCE as input to the G-8, Program Analysis and Evaluation Division (PA&E).



6. The Army Plan (TAP) is the principal Army guidance for development of the Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submission. The TAP articulates the CSA and SEC ARMY translation of the JCS/DOD guidance to all Services into specific direction to the ARSTAF and MACOMs for the development of the Army POM. The TAP also initiated the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process. ***The TAA process is under review and evolving to meet the Chief of Staff's guidance and needs.***

7. To get from the current force to the Chief's **vision** for the future force we have to understand the inputs and processes that may modify the **current force** into the **future force**. Note in the above graphic, The TAP, RDA and Army Mod Plan are highlighted as inputs. Additionally, OSD, COCOMs, previous decisions, approved restructuring initiatives and outside influences such as end-strength, dollars, stationing (BRAC) and procurement decisions are also inputs to this functional block. Based on the guidance and inputs, we modify our current force.

8. The determination of the size and content of the Army force structure is an iterative, risk-benefit, trade-off analysis process called Total Army Analysis (TAA). The TAA process is currently under review at the direction of the CSA. The TAA process is evolving as the ARSTAF completes TAA-11 and initiates TAA-13. Detailed information can be found in the TAA Primer at www.afms1.army.mil



9. The purpose of TAA is to develop **requirements** and **authorizations** defining the force structure the Army must build, raise, provision, sustain, maintain, train and resource.

10. The TAA process determines the size and content of the Army force structure ***capturing*** the Army's Operating Force: that is combat requirements (MTOE) and combat support and combat service support requirements; developing the Army's generating force requirements (TDA); and resourcing the force (MTOE & TDA, all components) over time. The TAA process establishes the recommended programmed force changes over the POM years (budget year plus five years).

a. AOE, Projection Army, and Force XXI designs. Until 2003 the Army was designed around the base unit of the division. Developing the CS and CSS force structure at Corps and Theater Army meant determining the echelon above division (EAD) and echelon above corps (EAC) force structure requirements during the TAA process. For the next decade, organizations in Compo 1 and 2 will be of the AOE, Projection Army and Force XXI. The force structure needs at EAD/EAC will decrease as the number of divisional organizations decrease and transform into modular brigades.

b. Modularity design. The combat force structure is transforming into modular brigade designs. TAA will determine the CS/CSS requirements to support the modular brigades. The CS/CSS organizations are being worked through this process. Unit composition and nomenclature will be determined through the FDU process and the TOE development phase. HQDA will develop new terminology as the TAA process progresses.



11. TAA determines the **requirement**s (number and type of units) through computer modeling. The models provide estimates for each Major Combat Operation CS/CSS organizational requirements. The organization requirements are based on the employed C/CS/CSS, consumption factors, allocation rules and the scenarios. The total requirements are prioritized within the "bins" or the **Simultaneity Stack**. At the end of the requirements phase, the VCSA approves the total requirements and directs the resourcing phase.

12. The requirements then compete for resourcing (authorized number of units, by type) based on Army leadership directives, written guidance, risk analysis and inputs from the Combatant Commanders. The resourcing phase determines which requirements have **authorizations** placed against them. This phase focused on aggregate spaces as the "coin of the realm" (officer / warrant officer / enlisted // aggregate spaces). Congress has provided an end strength for each component, broken out into officer / warrant officer / enlisted //aggregate, not by grade, skill or MOS level of detail. Each component, MACOM and branch is competing for the limited resources.

13. The ***requirements*** generated by the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) through computer modeling, is compared to the currently planned, programmed and budgeted subsets in SAMAS (all FYs). The comparison is called the MATCH Model. The model matches the type organization, the COMPO, the level of authorization, and location.



14. **EXAMPLE**: The aggregate number of HEAVY Engineer battalions "required" across the

simultaneity stack is 17. If the number of battalions currently in SAMAS, by FY, matches 17. There are no issues. If the number of battalions in SAMAS is greater than 17, some of the battalions are at risk of becoming "bill payers" for other initiatives. If the number of battalions in SAMAS is less than 17, the battalions not currently resourced become "claimants". The claimants are either resourced or the Army recognizes the shortfall, and takes risk in this area.

15. The ***KEY OUTPUTS*** from the TAA process are:

a. POM Force. The resulting force structure is forwarded to the CSA for approval. The CSA approved POM force is forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) with a recommendation for approval. The POM force contains the type organization, the FY, COMPO and the action (activation, inactivation, conversion, or reorganization).

b. Army Structure Message (ARSTRUC). The ARSTRUC provides the MACOMs the results of the TAA process. The ARSTRUC provides force structure guidance for each MACOM, by standard requirement code (SRC – i.e.: Inf, Arm, FA, ADA, SC, MP, QM, TC, etc), by FY by action. The ARSTRUC directs the action based on leadership guidance, resources available (dollars, personnel or equipment), and other force structure actions planned or programmed throughout the force.

c. Army's POM submission to OSD from the PPBE process.

DOCUMENT ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS.

1. After approval of the resourced force structure by Army leadership, USAFMSA manages the process of documenting the decision(s) and develops the authorization documents through The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS). This process results in the generation of organizational authorizations documented as modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) or tables of distribution and allowance (TDA).

2. The programmed and budgeted force is documented to unit identification code (UIC) level of detail to ensure that organizations may place demands on the functional systems of the Army.

3. Upon receipt of the ARSTRUC, the MACOMS prepare to conduct a forum called the Command Plan (CP).

4. The ARSTRUC is directive in nature. In the ARSTRUC the MACOMs



are directed to update the SAMAS (Structure and Manpower Allocation System).

a. All approved units get entered into SAMAS and are documented in The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS).

b. SAMAS is the automated database that records, maintains and distributes force structure information for the total Army.

c. SAMAS is the Army's "database of record" for all force structure actions.

d. The SAMAS database is updated based on the CSA decisions, announced in the ARSTRUC.

e. SAMAS contains the "Planned", "Programmed" and "budgeted" subsets, at the Unit Identification Code (UIC) level of detail over the period of the POM.

f. SAMAS maintains records on all COMPOS. The ARSTRUC delineates change based on the effective date (e-date) for each activation, inactivation, conversion; Authorized Level of Organization (ALO); or the fielding of a system approved by the CSA in the POM force.





g. The Army Flow Model (AFM) is accessed through the AKO G-3 (Operations) Portal on the Web. The AFM provides action officers with the capability of reviewing the SAMAS database through several formats. The format for AFM/ SAMAS may change over time as the Army brings the Army Force Management System (an integrated and interactive database) on line.

5. At this point we are documenting resources (people, equipment, dollars and facilities) for each unit in the Army. Authorization documents contain personnel and equipment authorizations at MOS, grade, LIN, ERC, and quantity level of detail in each organization.

6. Finally, the Structure and Composition System (SACS) computes the personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations based on integrating the input from BOIPs, TOEs, SAMAS, and TAADS to compute personnel (PERSACS) and equipment (LOGSACS) requirements and authorizations for the next ten years, compared to existing inventory of personnel and equipment.





7. **EXAMPLE**: ***Caution. The example described in this text was fairly accurate when developed. As time progresses, intervening decisions will cause changes not reflected in this example.***

a. The Army's leadership decided to transform the 10th Mountain Division over Fiscal Years (FY) 04 and 05 from the LID configuration to Modular (BCT (UA)).

b. In 2003 10th Mountain Division had two brigades assigned. To transform to a modular design, two new brigades are activated and two brigades convert from LID to BCT (UA) in FY 04 and 05. The diagram on the right reflects the leader decision, and established E-Dates for each action.



c. The location of the two new brigades was determined and announced through another action.

d. The conversion decisions were translated into planned and programmed actions in the SAMAS database. A representative example of the SAMAS display is highlighted on the right. The Army Flow Model (AFM) was queried for all Field Artillery organizations in FY 04 and 05 organic to the 10th Mountain Division. Note: the 155T battery (GS

UIC	Unit Name	EDATE	ACTCO	SRC	Authorizations	Remarks
WAXMAA	7TH FA BTRY	2004-09-15	J	06107A0	6 / 0 / 118 // 124	(GS Btry)
WA29AA	4-25TH FA BN	2004-09-16	A	06125G0	25 / 1 / 261 // 287	3RD BCT
WA3AAA	5-25TH FA BN	2005-01-16	A	06125G0	25 / 1 / 261 // 287	4TH BCT
WAHQAA WAHQAA	3-6TH FA BN 3-6TH FA BN	2002-10-16 2004-09-16	U C	06125L0 06125G0	38 / 3 / 376 // 417 25 / 1 / 261 // 287	1ST BCT
WEQ2AA WEQ2AA	2-15TH FA BN 2-15TH FA BN	2002-10-16 2005-09-16	U C	06125L0 06125G0	38 / 3 / 376 // 417 25 / 1 / 261 // 287	2ND BCT

artillery) is inactivating (ACTCO "J" – inactivation code), providing some of the "bill payer" spaces; 4-25 FA will "A" (activate); and 3-6 FA will "C" (convert) from a "L" edition SRC to a "G" edition SRC ("G" series SRC denotes Modular) all in FY 04. In FY 05, 5-25 FA will "A" (activate) and 2-15 FA will "C" (convert) to a modular design.

e. Based on the approved SAMAS database, an authorization document is developed by USAFMSA. The MTOE document process (referred to as Command Plan), provides the structure and forum for developing, reviewing, modifying and accepting the MTOE/TDA documents. Action officers can find the MTOES within WEBTAADS.

Example: MTOE Header

UIC			WEQ2AA				
UNIT			2D BN 15TH FA				
Parent Unit Title			FA BN,105MM T,LT INF DIV				
EDATE			16-OCT-04				
OFF		WO		ENL		TOTAL	
Req.	Auth.	Req.	Auth.	Req.	Auth.	Req.	Auth.
37	37	3	3	380	380	420	420
MACOM			FC				
DOCNO			06125LFC10				
CCNUM			0105				
CTU			0204				
SRC14			06125L00000100				
TOE Narrative			06125L000				
ALO			1				
TPACO			FF				
CUASC			FC				
AMSCO			11101400				
MDEP			W510				
Category Code			1				
Supercedes			06125LFC10/FC0104				
STATUS			APPROVED				
APPROVED BY			LILLY on 4/22/2003 3:11:42 PM				
SHIP DATE			6/13/2003				
COMPO			Active Army				
Questions:			POC List				

Personnel



Equipment



8. ***Key Output:***

a. SAMAS database: the Master Force (M-Force).

b. TAADS Documents: MTOE/TDA.

c. SACS.

ACQUIRE, TRAIN, and DISTRIBUTE PERSONNEL

1. Having developed the Authorization Document, we can now address whom we need to ACQUIRE, TRAIN, AND DISTRIBUTE in terms of personnel.

2. Based on the results of PERSACS, more specifically PMAD (Personnel Management Authorization Document), the Human Resources Command can compare the personnel authorizations, based on MTOEs and TDAs, to the current inventory of Soldiers by grade, skill and MOS.

3. The different personnel processes predict the recruiting, retention and training needs of the Army over the POM years.

4. The Human Resources Command will distribute personnel in accordance with the MTOE and TDA authorization, Army priorities and inventory available.

5. As you can see, this slide highlights several *INTER-CONNECTED* activities.



6. There are also a large variety of WEB Based tools to assist in accomplishing this rather daunting task.

7. Through this collective set of processes we can discuss the interface of the authorized space to the face assigned to that authorization. The DCS, G-1, assignment officers within the Human Resources Command and assignment officers within the MACOMS manage the personnel assets within the current and projected inventory.

8. The ***Key Output*** is the assignment of an individual, by grade, by skill and by MOS to a valid authorization.

ACQUIRE AND DISTRIBUTE EQUIPMENT

1. Having developed the Authorization Document, we can now address the materiel we can DISTRIBUTE and what we must ACQUIRE in terms of equipment.

2. Based on the results of LOGSACS, the DCS, G-4 and Army Materiel Command (AMC) can compare the equipment authorizations, based on MTOEs and TDAs, to the current inventory of equipment by Line Item Number (LIN), Equipment Readiness Code (ERC) and quantity.



3. Our logisticians acquire and allocate equipment based on:

   a. The total REQUIREMENTS, and total AUTHORIZATIONS (Line item number and quantity found in the MTOEs and TDAs).

   b. Equipment quantities on hand.

   c. Army PRIORITIES.



4. Leadership decisions, TAP guidance, Combatant Commanders' input and current operational needs, along with other factors --- determine how the equipment is distributed to the Army - **Including TDA organizations.**

5. The different equipping processes predict the on-hand quantities and shortages for units and preposition sets over the POM years.

6. The ***Key Output*** for this process is a distribution plan.



PROVIDE COMBAT READY UNITS

1. At this point - MANPOWER and EQUIPMENT have been acquired, personnel trained and both have been distributed to the Army to provide combat ready units to the Combatant Commanders.

2. There are many areas that can be evaluated to see if the Army has provided sufficient resources to meet the Combatant Commander's needs. The Combatant Commander and the Services were provided the same direction and guidance at the same time ("Purple - Green" interface).

3. Two of the issues the Army must address during this period of Transformation are STATIONING and READINESS.

a. **STATIONING.**

1. Modularity activates a 4th maneuver brigade for each division. The stationing of each brigade is critical within limited existing facilities.

2. There is potential for redeployment of troops from Europe and Korea to CONUS in the next 10 years, based on a Presidential announcement.

3. BRAC.

4. Congress has authorized an increase of 30,000 end strength to the Active Component. Although a short term increase (proposed for less than 10 years), the impact of growing the Army by 30,000 spaces increases the need for recruiters and facilities, basic and AIT training facilities, and ultimately unit facilities. Additionally, the Army must prudently plan for how to take down the 30,000 end strength when the authorization period runs out.



5. Each of these stationing issues bring FACILITY issues to the table for UNITS – such as motor pools, billets and ranges.

6. The same issues bring FACILITIES for FAMILIES –such as commissaries, post exchanges, hospitals, churches, schools, and recreational facilities to the table.

7. The stationing considerations are not limited to the Active Component. They apply to the National Guard, the Army Reserve and DA Civilians.







b. **READINESS.**

1. Remember, the Combatant Commanders and the Army were provided the same guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense (SPG/JPG) in the beginning of the process. The Army must provide to the combatant commanders the force structure required to meet the tasks the President and the Secretary of Defense have articulated.

2. The Army is evaluated on our ability to "Provide necessary forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the



National Security and Defense Strategies." That is, provide those Combatant Commander's with **"COMBAT READY Organizations**" to execute the directed missions.

4. The ***Key Output*** is the evaluation of how well the Army provided combat ready organizations to the Combatant Commanders.

SUMMARY: Although the Army Force Management Model depicts a **some-what linear** model, in a **sequential** manner, managing change may mandate that any one or several of these processes occur **simultaneously**, in **parallel**, in **compressed** format or in **reverse** depending on **urgency**, **risk** and senior leader **guidance**. It is important to note that eventually all of the processes and systems must be addressed to field, maintain, sustain and resource the current and future Army force structure.

What is not depicted in the Army Force Management Model are all of the potential coordination lines between systems, processes or blocks. Alternative paths, not reflected in the model, may be needed to verify impacts of decisions, re-evaluation when a solution is rejected based on a change in strategy, threat, leadership decisions or resourcing or identification of a new capability required based on identification of a new or different capabilities gap.

When a solution has been determined, resourced, funded and documented, the solution becomes the major input to other processes such as the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model, Force Integration Functional Areas (FIFA), Force Feasibility Review (FFR), and Force Validation Committee (FVC) for implementation and evaluation.